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ANTITRUST-ExcHANGE OF PRICE INFORMATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION I
OF THE SHERMAN AcT-United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969)-In 1963 the United States Department of Justice instituted a
civil antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina against the Container Corporation of America and 17 other manu-
facturers of corrugated containers alleging a price fixing agreement in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The essence of the alleged violation was that the
defendants, who controlled 90 percent of the corrugated container market in the
Southeastern United States, had, since 1955, participated in an agreement to ex-
change price information as to the most recent prices charged or quoted to specific
customers in particular transactions. The Justice Department charged that this
agreement had the effect of restricting price competition in the southeastern sector
of the corrugated container market.2 The district court held that the requesting and
furnishing of price information by the defendants did not have the effect of elim-
inating, reducing, minimizing or restricting price competition. 3 On direct appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exchange of price infor-
mation had resulted in a stabilization of prices and constituted a violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.4
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "(e)very contract, combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade..." is prohibited. Early Supreme Court decisions con-
strued this language as an absolute prohibition against activities that had the effect
of restraining trade. 5 However, in Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States,6
the Supreme Court narrowed this seemingly peremptory ban by interpreting section 1
as declaring illegal only those agreements that effectuate an unreasonable restraint
of trade. In the application of the "rule of reason"7 the court determines in each
case whether the alleged violative conduct produces an unreasonable restraint of
trade under the given circumstances. While this rule of reason is the standard that
has generally been applied in restraint of trade cases, the courts have recognized
that ". . .certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use" 8 -i.e. illegal per se.9  In 1940
1 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1964), provides: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "
2 The district court found that the price information was requested from a competitor in-
frequently, and only if it was not available from the defendants' records or customers. United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 59 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
3 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 67-68 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
The court concluded that the evidence presented did not support the inference that there was
either an agreement to exchange price information or that such agreement existed for the pur-
pose of stabilizing or controlling prices.
4 393 U.S. 333, 336 (1969).
5 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); Northern Se-
curities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
6221 U.S. 1 (1911).
7 Ia United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the famous companion
decision to the Standard Oil case, the Court succinctly articulated the rule of reason, stating
that" ... the words 'restraint of trade' . . (embraced) acts which operated to the prejudice of
public interests by unduly restricting competition ... or which, either because of their inherent
nature of effect, or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrain trade..
221 U.S. at 179.
WNorthern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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the Supreme Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,'0 held that "a com-
bination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se." 11 A violation, generically known as price fixing was thus estab-
lished as a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act thus dictates that a "contract, combination. . .or
conspiracy. .." and, by judicial construction, an unreasonable restraint of trade are
the prerequisites to a successful prosecution under that section. In Container, Jus-
tice Douglas looked to the reciprocal nature of the price information exchange12
to find the conspiracy required by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Justice Fortas,
concurring, also found a tacit agreement and Justice Marshall, dissenting, con-
curred in the finding that an agreement existed among the defendants.13 However,
the only support offered for the inference of the agreement in Container was a foot-
note comment by Justice Douglas in which he distinguished the activities in the
instant case from the parallel business behavior condoned by the Supreme Court in
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.14 In that case the
court held that the parallel behavior of the defendants, who were motion picture
producers and distributors, in refusing to furnish the plaintiff with "first run"
motion pictures in its suburban theatre was explainable on the basis of the independ-
ent self interest of each. The Court in Theatre Enterprises therefore concluded
that the existence of an agreement was not a necessary inference from the fact that
the defendants all acted in the same way. Justice Douglas did not articulate the dis-
tinction between the instant case and Theatre Enterprises, but he appears to have
accepted the government's contention that the defendants' activity in Container was
not independant, but the result of collaboration and that Theatre Enterprises was
therefore inapplicable. 15
The question which the court in Container thought more fundamental than that
of the conspiracy, and to which it actively addressed itself, was whether the ex-
change of price information had resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. In
this respect the Court considered several factors, including the oligopolistic nature
of the corrugated container market, the fungibility of corrugated containers, the
inelastic demand for such containers and the excess capacity existing in the corru-
gated container market. Although prices were falling,' 6 the Court concluded that
0 Among the activities that have been deemed unlawful per se are price fixing, United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); division of markets, United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boy-
cotts, Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); tying arrangements, Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); and certain sales commission systems for
the marketing of tires, batteries, and accessories by service stations affiliated with major oil com-
panies, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
10 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11 Id. at 223.
12 Justice Douglas reasoned that each defendant furnished data to his competitor with the
expectation that he would be furnished with similar information upon his request. United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969). The district court, however,
had held that, because of the infrequency and lack of uniformity of the information furnished,
the government had failed to establish the existence of an agreement to exchange price informa-
tion. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 58-59 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
13 393 U.S. 333, 340.
14 346 U.S. 537 (1954). The footnote comment appears at 393 U.S. at 335.
1 Brief for Appellant at 19-20. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969).
16 393 U.S. 333, 336 (1969).
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in this type of market the result of the reciprocal exchange of price information was
the stabilization of prices at a downward level.1 7 Apparently responding to the
government's argument that the defendants' "concerted activity aimed at limiting
price competition or tampering with price is unlawful per se,"' 8 the Court held,
relying on United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil,19 that "interference with the setting
of price by free market forces is unlawful per se." 20  Thus, the Court implicitly
brought the instant case within the ban of Socony. While the Court conceded
that the exchange of price information in some markets may have no effect on a
truly competitive price, it held that in Container, because of the market character-
istics of the corrugated container industry, the information exchange had resulted in
price uniformity. In concluding, the Court observed that "the inferences are irre-
sistable that the exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect in
the industry, chilling the vigor of price competition." 2' 1
The majority opinion in Container is somewhat ambiguous. A cursory reading
of the opinion suggests that the per se rule has been extended to the practice of ex-
changing price information. Arguably, since nothing in the opinion expressly ne-
gates such a reading and since the Court appears to establish some sort of a rela-
tionship between Socony and the instant case, one might indeed conclude that a new
per se rule has been announced. However, a reading of the opinion which is more
consistent with the actual thrust of the majority's decision suggests that the rule of
reason inquiry, rather than the per se approach, was applied. While the Court
stated that "(t)he result of this reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize prices
though at a downward level"22 and that "(k)nowledge of a competitors price usu-
ally meant matching that price,"2 3 it further stated that "(p)rice information ex-
changed in some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price." 24  The
Court appears to have rejected the idea that the exchange of price information will
always lead to price stabilization-a necessary concomitant to the announcement of
a per se rule. The above language would therefore indicate that the court was limit-
ing its condemnation of the exchange of price information, in terms of its effect on
price, to the factual context of the instant case-the traditional application of the
rule of reason. Furthermore, the Court concentrated on the economic character-
istics of the corrugated container industry in reaching its conclusion that "(t)he ex-
change of price data tends toward price uniformity." 25 It was within the economic
setting of the corrugated container market that the Court thought "(p)rice (was)
too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an informal man-
ner to restrain competition." 26  If the Court had intended to announce a new per
se rule, the economics of the situation would have been inconsequential since in
per se analysis a practice ". . . (is) presumed to be unreasonable and therefore il-
legal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm (it has) caused... ."2 7
17 Id.
18Brief for Appellant at 13, United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333
(1969), citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
19 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
20 393 U.S. at 337.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 336.
23Id. at 336-337.
24 Id. at 337.
25 Id.
26 1d. at 338.
27 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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The validity of this "non per se" reading of the majority opinion in Container
is further supported by the Court's treatment of previous exchange of price informa-
tion cases. The Court factually distinguished the instant case from Cement Manu-
facturers Protective Association v. United States,28 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States,29 and Maple Flooring Mfgs. Ass'n. v. United States,s0 all decided under the
rule of reason rationale. The necessary result of the adoption of a per se rule in
Container would have been the overruling of these cases. Yet the Court chose not
to do that. Similarly, the Court concluded that American Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States31 and United States v. American Lindseed Oil,32 in which the
court applied the rule of reason inquiry, were analogous to the instant case. Against
this background there is little indication that the Court sought to establish a new
per se rule.
Finally, Justices Fortas and Marshall, writing the concurring and dissenting
opinions respectively, both rejected the application of a per se rule to the exchange
of price information since such activity neither necessarily interferes with the "price
mechanism of the market place"3 3 nor "is so devoid of potential benefit or so in-
herently harmful. .. 84 Justice Fortas in the opening remarks to his concurring
opinion explicitly repudiates any contention that a new per se rule is announced by
the majority, saying:
I do not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exchange of spe-
cific information among sellers as to prices charged to individual custom-
ers, pursuant to mutual arrangement, is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.8 5
Justice Marshall, filing a strong dissent, instructed the majority that "(t)his Court
has refused to apply a per se rule to exchanges of price and market information in
the past... (and) we should follow the same course in the present case."8 6
The rationale that will ultimately be applied to the practice of price informa-
tion exchange is, of course, questionable. However, it is suggested that there ap-
pears to be no immediate need or justification to abandon the rule of reason inquiry
traditionally applied in this type of case and create a new classification of per se vio-
lations. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, the application of a per se
rule is only proper if "the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs
of determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful... far out-
weigh the benefits that may result"37 from not absolutely prohibiting the activity.
The potential competitive harm of the exchange of price information is obviously
not self-evident. This is dearly illustrated by the six to three split of the Court
over the question of whether an unreasonable restraint of trade had, in fact, resulted
and the Court's own admission that the exchange of price information in some mar-
kets may have no effect on competition. In addition, the Court has recognized in
the past that there may be a legitimate business justification for the exchange of
28268 U.S. 588 (1925).
29 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
30268 U.S. 563 (1925).
31257 U.S. 377 (1921).
32262 U.S. 371 (1923).
33 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 339 (1969).
14 Id. at 341.
35Id. at 338-339.
361d. at 341.
37Id.
1970]
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price information 38 and that such an exchange may have no appreciable effect on
price in a competitive market.39 The application of a per se rule would therefore
produce harsh and inequitable results unwarranted by any consideration of the
rights of the consuming public. The government should thus be required to prove
an adverse effect on price from an exchange of price information in the usual rule
of reason fashion. The lower federal courts should interpret the Container deci-
sion as applying the traditional rule of reason rather than a per se approach.
John S. Izzie
INCOME TAX-EXCLUDABILITY OF SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS
UNDER SECTION 117 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954-Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U. S. 741 (1969)-Johnson, Wolfe and Pomerantz held engineering
positions at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which
is operated by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. They all participated in a pro-
gram known as the Westinghouse Bettis Fellowship and Doctoral Program which
involves a two-phase schedule of subsidized post-graduate studies in engineering,
physics or mathematics. Under the second phase of the program they were granted
an educational leave for the purpose of completing the dissertation requirement for
their doctoral degrees. During this leave they were paid a certain percentage of
their prior salaries and Federal Income Tax was withheld from these amounts.
They filed claims for refunds, contending the payments they had received were
"'scholarships," and hence were excludable from gross income under Section 117 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule,-In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section
151 (e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant ....
38 Cement Mfgs. Protective Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
-
39 Maple Flooring Mfgs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Tag Mfrs. Institute
v. FrC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
1 The entire section reads as follows:
Section 117. Scholarships and fellowship grants.
(a) General rule.
In the case of an individual, gross income does not include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section 151
(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services and accom-
modations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to the ex-
tent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
(b) Limitations.
(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.
In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an education insti-
[Vol. 31
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
When those claims were rejected, the respondents instituted an action for a re-
fund in the Federal District Court. After the basically undisputed evidence re-
garding the Bettis Program had been presented, the trial judge instructed the jury in
accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 1.117-4(c), which provides that
amounts representing "compensation for past, present, or future employment ser-
vices," and amounts "paid... to... an individual to enable him to pursue studies
or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor," are not excludable as scholar-
ships. 2  The jury found the amounts received under the Bettis Program were tax-
tution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)), subsection (a) shall not apply to that por-
tion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other
services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving
the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are re-
quired of all candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants)
for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research,
or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning
of this paragraph.
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.
In the case of an individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution (as defined in section 151 (e)(4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the
condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the limitations pro-
vided in subparagraph (B).
(A) Conditions for exclusion.
The grantor of the scholarship or fellowship grant is-
(i) an organization described in section 501 (c)(3) which is exempt from tax
under section 501(a),
(ii) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multinational education
and cultural foundation or commission created or continued pursuant to the Mu-
tual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) The United States, or an instrumentality or agency thereof, or a State, a ter-
ritory, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof or
the District of Columbia.
(B) Extent of exclusion.
The amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant excluded under subsection (a)(1)
in any taxable year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of
months for which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellow-
ship grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under
subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to exclude under this section for
a period of 36 months (whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholar-
ship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for a degree at an educational institu-
tion (as defined in section 151(e)(4)).2 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (1956). Items not considered as scholarships or fellowships
grants.
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be amounts re-
ceived as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of
the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid or
allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research,
if such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future employ-
ment services or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or
supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor. However,
amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue
studies or research are considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or fellow-
ship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or re-
search is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual ca-
pacity and the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent
19701
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able income. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It held that
the Regulation referred to was invalid, that the jury instructions were therefore im-
proper and that on the essentially undisputed facts it was clear as a matter of law
that amounts received by the respondents were "scholarships" excludable under
Section 117.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Under the first phase of the Westinghouse Bettis Fellowship and Doctoral Pro-
gram a participant holds a regular job with Westinghouse and is given up to eight
hours per week "release" time for the purpose of attending classes. When an em-
ployee has completed all preliminary requirements for his doctorate, he may apply
for an educational leave of absence which is the second phase of this program. His
dissertation topic is required to have at least a general relevance to the work at Bet-
tis Laboratory and is subject to approval by Westinghouse. If the topic is ap-
proved and leave is granted, the employee then spends the next several months in
fulfilling his dissertation requirement while receiving a stipend from Westing-
house. The stipend is based on a specific percentage of the employee's prior salary.
Johnson and Pomerantz took leaves of nine months and were paid $5,670 each, re-
presenting 80% of their prior salaries. Wolfe's leave lasted a year and he received
$9,698.90 or 90% of his prior salary. Certain additional payments were made
based on the size of the employee's family. Each of the men retained seniority
status and all employee benefits, such as insurance and stock option privileges. In
return they were required to submit periodic progress reports. At the end of their
leave, Johnson and Pomerantz were obligated under a written contract they had
signed to return to the employ of Westinghouse for a period of two years. Wolfe
had been told before his leave that he was expected to return for a period of one
year. Westinghouse under its own accounting system listed the amounts paid to
these employees as "indirect labor" expenses and withheld Federal Income Tax.
In reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals the Supreme Court stressed
five main points which contributed to the disqualification of these payments as
scholarships:
(1) The employer-employee relationship-Not only were the recipients
employees of the grantor prior to and during the educational leaves
but in addition, they were required to return to work for a definite
period of time after their leave.
(2) Continuation of the employee benefits-Insurance and stock option
privileges were available to recipients during their leaves and they
retained their seniority status.
(3) Close relation of stipends to prior salaries-The stipends were 80%
to 90% of the recipients prior salaries (not including additional al-
lowances for dependents).
(4) Requirement that the topics relate to the work of the Bettis Labora-
tory--Topics had to be submitted to Westinghouse for approval.
(5) Periodic work reports-Recipients were required to keep Westing-
house abreast of their progress.
After reviewing the above facts, Justice Stewart concluded:
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1) of this para-
graph. Neither the fact that the recipient is required to furnish reports of his prog-
ress to the grantor, nor the fact that the results of his studies or research may be of
some incidental benefit to the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the
essential character of such amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
3 Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968).
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Under that provision, 4 as set out in the trial court's instructions, thejury here properly found that the amounts received by the respondents
were taxable 'compensation' rather than excludable 'scholarships' . .. .
Westinghouse unquestionably extracted a quid pro quo .... The thrust
of the provision dealing with compensation is that bargained-for payments,
given only as a quo in return for the quid of services rendered-whether
past, present, or future-should not be excludable from income as 'schol-
arship' funds.5
This decision was the first by the Supreme Court involving Section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c)(1956). In
upholding the validity of the Regulations the Supreme Court elected to follow the
position taken by the Courts of Appeals 6 for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits.
The Third Circuit in Johnson v. Bingler7 rejected the approach of the other
Courts of Appeal and substituted their own test of whether the subject grants were
"reasonable" payments exhibiting the "normal characteristics" of scholarships. In
the opinion Judge Weiner starts with the premise that the dominant legislative in-
tent behind Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, is "that of encour-
aging financial aid to students . . .through the device of limited tax relief." 8 He
points out that the amount of the exclusion is limited only for those students who
are not candidates for a degree. Applying the canon of statutory construction ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other), he concludes that Congress included the sole restructions it wished to place
on the excludability of scholarships for degree candidates in the language of Sec-
tion 117 (b) (1). In that section degree candidates are prevented from excluding
any payments for services required as a condition for the grants. He takes issue
with the Treasury Regulations which he believes purport to add two other restric-
tions on the excludability of payments. Here he is referring to the sections which
would subject to taxation any amounts which "represent either compensation for
past, present or future employment services" or which are "primarily for the bene-
fit of the grantor."9  Under this line of reasoning Judge Weiner concludes that:
. ..any reasonable stipend which comes within the common understand-
ing of what constitutes a scholarship, is paid to finance the schooling of
a degree candidate, and does not fall within the limitation of Section 117
(b) (1) is excluded from gross income.' 0
Under this approach only two questions must be answered. The first is whether
or not the payment is a scholarship or a fellowship grant. Judge Weiner admits
that the characteristics of a scholarship or fellowship grant are "far from dear,"1 1
but he is able to qualify the subject grants as such by pointing out some of the
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c), cited note 2, supra.
5 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 755-58 (1969).
6 See generally, Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961); Reese v. Commis-
sioner, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966);
and Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); See also, Reiffen v. United
States, 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. C1. 1967).
7 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968).
8 Id. at 260.
9Treas. Reg. 1.117-4(c)(1)-(2) (1956).
10 Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1968).
11 Id. at 263.
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salient "normal characteristics" of scholarships and fellowships exhibited by the
grants in question: 12
Appellants' stipends were awarded as subsidies to full-time students in an
amount bearing an appropriate relation to each recipient's needs. Their
continuance was contingent upon the participant's maintenance of the aca-
demic standards required of a candidate for a graduate degree by the uni-
versity which each appellant attended. While receiving these grants, ap-
pellants were on an academic leave of absence from their employment for
the specific purpose of completing their doctoral dissertations. 13
After it is determined that the payments being considered are scholarships or
fellowships the question remaining is whether or not the payments are "reasonable."
Because he views Section 117 as a Congressional attempt to encourage graduate
study through the device of tax relief, Judge Weiner is willing to be very lenient
in his requirement of reasonableness. He points out that if the payments were not
based on a substantial percentage of prior income, employees, such as those in this
case, would be hard pressed to leave work for a year to pursue an advanced degree.
By first deciding that he is dealing with a scholarship or fellowship and then find-
ing the amount to be reasonable, Judge Weiner is able to find the subject grants
excludable from gross income under Section 117.
The above result could not have been reached, however, without first rejecting
the definitions of scholarships and fellowships contained in the Treasury Regula-
tions. 14 It is here that the Supreme Court finds fault with the Third Circuit's
opinion. Judge Weiner invalidated Treasury Regulation 117.4(c) (1)-(2) (1956)
and replaced it with his own concept of the "normal characteristics" of scholar-
ships and fellowships. Justice Stewart points out that the Commissioner, not the
courts, was given the power by Congress to implement the provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. This power includes prescribing all necessary rules for en-
forcing the Code. Since Congress did not define the terms "scholarship" and
"fellowship" as used in Section 117 it was perfectly proper for the Commissioner to
define the scope of these terms in the Regulations. Having done so these Regula-
tions "must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the rev-
enue statutes," and "should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."' 1  Jus-
tice Stewart did not believe that the legislative history "precludes, as 'plainly in-
consistent' with the statute, a definition of 'scholarship' that excludes from the
reach of that term amounts received as compensation for services performed."' 6
Thus the Supreme Court endorsed the "compensation" test of the Treasury Regula-
tions and rejected the Third Circuit's test of "reasonable" payments exhibiting the
"normal characteristics" of scholarships. Previous to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Johnson a lower court had said in regard to the Third Circuit's view:
This court believes the weight of authority is the sounder view and is
contrary to Johnson. To follow the view of Johnson would permit nearly
any payment labeled 'scholarship' or 'fellowship' and not expressly within
the restrictions of Section 117 (b) (1) to be excluded from gross income.
The court does not believe that the legislative history of this section leads
to that conclusion.' 7
121d. at 259.
13 Id.
14Treas. Reg. 1.117-4(c)(1)-(2) (1956).
15 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
16 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969).
17 Quast v. U.S., 293 F. Supp. 56, 61 (1968).
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This statement adequately summarizes the Supreme Court's view of this case.
In order to fully understand the importance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bingler v. Johnson it is necessary to examine the way problems under Section 117
had been handled in prior cases. Under the 1939 Code scholarships and fellow-
ships had not been given separate treatment. In order to be excludable they had to
meet the requirements of gifts and so the courts applied a test of "gift" versus
"compensation."' s This made a case by case determination necessary and it was
this which Congress was seeking to end by its passage of Section 117 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Congress desired to eliminate "the existing confusion as
to whether such payments are to be treated as income or as gifts."' 9 Congress rec-
ognized that "scholarships and fellowships" were "sufficiently unique" to warrant
tax treatment "separate from that accorded gifts." 20  But, as the Supreme Court in
Bingler v. Johnson points out, the "delineation of the precise contours" of the
categories of scholarships and fellowships was left to the determination of the Com-
missioner.2' The result of this determination was Treasury Regulation Section
1.117 which, unfortunately, did not accomplish the Congressional purpose of end-
ing case by case determinations. In fact, the old "gift" versus "compensation"
test was revived under the heading of Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c) 22 which re-
quired an inquiry as to the motive of the grantor (primary purpose) and a deter-
uination as to whether the grant constituted "compensation." 23  In actual operation
this section of the Regulations fostered three basic approaches; the "primary pur-
pose" test, the "indicia of compensation" test and a third which is merely a con-
bination of the first two.
The "primary purpose" test arose from the language of Treasury Regulation
1.117-4(c) (2) which exempts from the definition of scholarships and fellowships
any amount paid to an individual to enable him to pursue "studies or research pri-
marily for the benefit of the grantor."24  (emphasis added). In Ussery v. United
StatesZ- a state public welfare department employee received compensation while
on educational leave. The leave was granted under a formal agreement outlining
his obligation to return to duties with the department and stating that the purpose
of the grant was to improve the efficiency of the department. The court found
that under these facts the primary purpose of the grant was to benefit the grantor.
In Reiffen v. United States26 the Court of Claims held a research laboratory's pay-
ments to a taxpayer, to enable him to pursue studies and research at a university
with which the laboratory was connected, were not a scholarship or fellowship
grant and were not excludable from gross income. The court said the payments
"were made [to plaintiff] to enable him to pursue studies and research primarily for
the benefit of" the grantor.27 Thus it can be seen that the "primary purpose" test
18 See Stone v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
19 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
20 Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury Policy,
1960 WA&s U.LQ. 144, 151. For a somewhat different apprach see, Chommie, Services
Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs Exemption of Study Grants, 4 JOURNAL OF TAXATION
375 (1956).
21 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 753 (1969).
22 Cited note 2, supra.
23 Gordon, supra note 20, at 157.
24 Cited note 2, supra.
25 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
26 376 F.2d 883 (1967).
27 Id. at 890.
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involves a determination of whether the grant was made in order to benefit the
grantor or grantee. This necessitates an investigation into the grantor's motives.
Under the second test, i.e., "indicia of compensation," the courts merely look to
see if the grant has the characteristics usually associated with compensation. In
Stewart v. United States28 a Tennessee Department of Public Welfare employee re-
ceived monthly stipends and other benefits during an educational leave of absence
and was required to return to her previous position. In finding the stipends tax-
able the court rejected the "primary purpose" test. They stated that "consideration
of the facts as indicia of compensation for services is a more meaningful test than
that of whether the stipend was primarily for the benefit of the grantor."2 9  The
reasoning behind this rejection of the "primary purpose" test was that in any em-
ployment relationship, past or future, there is at least some mutuality of benefit.
This makes it difficult in many cases to determine whether or not the grant was
primarily for the benefit of the grantor. The court in Stewart thought it was easier
to look for "indicia of compensation."
The third test is actually a combination of "primary purpose" and "indicia of
compensation." In Woddail v. Commissioner30 a physician was employed full-time
by a Veteran's Administration hospital where he received residence training in psy-
chiatry and neurology in addition to his regular duties. The court found the amount
paid to Woddail was "an amount paid for services and was primarily for the
benefit of the grantor." 3' Thus they employed both tests in finding the payments
taxable. Another case employing both tests was Evans v. Comrissioner32 where
the "primary purpose" of the payments was to train the recipient and they were
not compensation for services.
Against this backdrop of conflicting approaches the Supreme Court decided
Bingler v. Johnson. The court relied heavily on the "indicia of compensation"
test and did not even mention the "primary purpose" test in the main body of its
opinion. In footnote 3233 the court states that it views the "primarily for the
benefit of the grantor" paragraph as merely an adjunct to the initial "compensation"
provision. The court believes this paragraph was added to impose income tax on
bargained-for arrangements which do not create an employer-employee relation-
ship. This would indicate that the court would not even look to the "primary pur-
pose" of a grant except in cases where there was no employer-employee relation-
ship of any kind. In applying the "indicia of compensation" test the Supreme
Court stressed the "bargained-for" aspects of the grant and stated that the most
important fact was that Westinghouse "extracted a quid pro quo for its grants." 34
Thus, it should be clear that in future cases if the grant is bargained-for and ser-
vices are rendered (whether past, present or future) in exchange for the payment,
then it will not be found to be a "scholarship" or "fellowship" under Section 117.
Harry D. Cornett, Jr.
28 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966).
29d at 357.
30 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963).
31 Id. at 724.
32 34 T.C. 720 (1960).
33 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 758 (1969).
34 Id. at 757.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-THE OHIO SAVING STATUTE AND THE RIGHT TO
VOLUNTARILY DIsMss-Beckner v. Stover, 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 247 N.E.2d 300
(1969)-Plaintiff commenced an action in May, 1964, in the Common Pleas Court
of Franklin County to recover damages that she suffered in an automobile collision
on September 12, 1963 due to the alleged negligence of the defendant. On the
second day of the trial, after the defense had rested, the plaintiff's attorney attempted
to recall a medical witness who had been excused in the morning and was not pres-
ent at the courthouse. The trial judge denied the plaintiff's request. The plain-
tiff then offered to introduce into evidence an artide concerning whiplash injuries.
The court sustained an objection to this. As a result of the court's rulings the
plaintiff moved to dismiss the action without prejudice under the voluntary dis-
missal statute.' The court granted the motion. The plaintiff, on November 10,
1966, the same day as the dismissal, commenced a new action. The defendant,
however, moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations.2 The court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss, and
the plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that "... . any voluntary nonsuit or dismissal of a case .... qualifies
as a case which 'fails otherwise than upon the merits' within the special savings [sic]
statute, section 2305.19, [Ohio] Revised Code" 3 which provides that:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time
a judgment for plaintiff is reversed, or if the plantiff fails otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such
action at the date of a reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff.. may
commence a new action within one year after such date....4
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that where a
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action without prejudice there is no "failure other-
wise than upon the merits" under the saving statute when his dismissal is " . . . in
response to adverse rulings of the trial court, unless those rulings will prevent a trial
of the cause upon its merits."
The meaning of "failure otherwise than upon the merits" was first construed by
the Supreme Court in Siegfried v. Railroad Co.6 in 1893. The court reasoned that
a failure, within the purview of the saving statute, implied an effort or purpose to
succeed. A plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed, thereby abandoning his action, did
not evidence a purpose or effort to succeed. He therefore did not fail and could
not gain an extra year in which to commence a new action. The failure had to be a
result of " . . . some action by the court, by which the plaintiff is defeated without
a trial upon the merits." 7
I OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.05 (Page 1953), provides that:
An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action:
(A) By the plaintiff, before its final submission to the jury, or to the court,
when the trial is by the court;
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1953).
3 Beckner v. Stover, 42 Ohio Op. 2d 382, 13 Ohio App. 2d 222 (1968).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953).
G Beckner v. Stover, 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 37, 247 N.E.2d 300, 301 (1969).
050 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893); for a discussion of § 2305.19 of the Ohio Revised
Code and judicial interpretation of "an action commenced or attempted to be commenced" as
used in the statute see 28 OHIo ST. L J. 558 (1967).
7 Id. at 296, 34 N.E. at 332.
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The Siegfried interpretation of the voluntary dismissal and the saving statute
was dosely adhered to by Ohio courtss until 1960 when the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished it in Cero Realty Corp. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance
Co.9 In that case the plaintiff had suffered the sustaining of two demurrers by
the court for misjoinder of parties and could not proceed further. The plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and refiled the action. Since the statute
of limitations had run, the plaintiff invoked the saving statute in support of his
recommencement. The court noted that section 2305.19 of the Ohio Revised Code
was remedial in nature and entitled to a liberal construction and stated that exdud-
ing all voluntary dismissals from the operation of the statute was an unduly nar-
row interpretation- Here the plaintiff's dismissal was voluntary but was attribut-
able to adverse rulings by the trial court and such a dismissal was a "failure" under
the meaning and terms of the statute.10
After Cero was decided it was suggested that the Ohio rule, as set forth in
Siegfried, might be narrowed to the extent that only a plaintiff who dismissed for
no apparent reason would be prohibited from invoking the saving statute. But
where an adverse ruling by the court impelled the plaintiff to follow a course of
dismissal, he would be permitted to gain an extra year in which to refile.11
Cero seemingly placed Ohio law in an equivocal or transitional stage. It could
easily have led to a rule bringing all voluntary dismissals within the purview of the
saving statute - a rule which prevails in many states.' 2 However the Supreme
Court in Beckner dispelled such notions and relied on Siegfried to reject the idea
that any adverse ruling by the court would be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to
withdraw his suit voluntarily and reinstitute it under the saving statute. The court
pointed out that the plaintiff's alernative to dismissal in Cero was to suffer an ad-
verse judgment or curtail critical elements of his complaint, and to term such a dis-
missal as voluntary would be an incorrect designation. 13 The court said that only a
voluntary dismissal due to an adverse ruling which would " ... prevent a trial of the
cause upon its merits"' 4 would constitute a "failure otherwise than upon the
merits." This is quite similar to the language employed in Siegfried.15
The opinion in the principal case clearly recognizes that the trial court has the
authority to conduct the trial as it sees fit and stresses that alleged errors made by
the court are to be settled by recourse to the appellate courts of the state after the
cause has been tried on its merits. The saving statute is not to be used as an alter-
native or substitute for the appellate process.' 6 It seems apparent that, when the
statute of limitations has run, a plaintiff may safely exercise his right to voluntarily
dismiss without prejudice only when he is confronted with a ruling by the court
which would force him to suffer an adverse judgment without the merits being
reached.
8 Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931); see
also Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1961) for a listing of other relevant Ohio cases after Siegfried.
9 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774 (1960).
'Old. at 86, 167 N.E.2d at 777.
1l Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1301 (1961).
12 See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1961) for a discussion on allowing and disallowing a
voluntary dismissal or nonsuit to come under the saving or extension statutes of states and for a
partial listing of states that follow each rule.
Is 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 39, 247 N.E.2d 300, 302.
14Id. at 37, 247 N.E.2d at 301.
15 50 Ohio St. 294, 296, 34 N.E. 331, 332.
16 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 39, 40, 247 N.E.2d 300, 302.
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In reinstating the Siegfried rule, the court in Beckner was concerned with the
possibility of abuse by plaintiff. The court's concern with allowing a plaintiff to
dismiss on his own and refile under the saving statute was not only that this would
permit a plaintiff to avoid the appellate process to determine claimed errors but that
it would also authorize ".... a practice [by which] parties could try and retry their
cases indefinitely until the most favorable circumstances for submission were finally
achieved."' 7 The defendant-appellant argued that under the ruling of the court of
appeals a plaintiff could try a case up until the time it is to be submitted to the jury
and then dismiss and refile. "He can continue to do this time after time, and there
is no limitation upon how frequently he can do this."'I s The court agreed that this
possibility of abuse was too great, stating that the saving statute "... neither pro-
vides nor permits such a practice."' 19
However, the question of whether the saving statute would permit such a practice
was answered in the negative years ago in Bush v. Cole.20 The opinion was af-
firmed per curiam by the Supreme Court.2 ' In that case the court of appeals stated
that the saving statute did not "authorize repeated new actions within one year
after the discontinuance of the preceding action ...[nor could] a cause of action
be kept alive and litigation prolonged indefinitely by plaintiff." 22  The court there
reasoned that the action commenced, as referred to in the saving statute, must be an
action brought within the statute of limitations and that if the plaintiff "failed
otherwise than upon the merits" after the original period had run, he then was
granted but one year to commence a new action. 23
This decision, though not relied on by the court in Beckner, appears to solve
the problem of potential abuse posed by the defendant and the court. It is also in
line with numerous courts across the country which have considered this question.2 4
It is generally held that the privilege can be exercised but one time.2 5  Therefore,
17Id. at 40, 247 N.E.2d at 303.
18 Brief for Appellant at 2, Beckner v. Stover, 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 247 N.E.2d 300 (1969).
19 18 Ohio St 2d 36, 40, 247 N.E.2d 300, 303.
20 1 Ohio App. 269 (1913).
21 91 Ohio St. 369, 110 N.E. 1056 (1914).
2 Bush v. Cole, 1 Ohio App. 269, 271 (1913).
231d. at 271.
24Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1230 (1957).
2 5 Annot., 83 A.LR. 487 (1933); An early Ohio case has been cited as having held that
two successive actions may be brought within the "saving" year, Schock v. J.A. Frazier & Co.,
6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1078, 10 Ana. L Rec. 305 (1881), see Annot, supra at 488. The plaintiff
in that case filed his first action on Sept 15, 1878, one day before the statute of limitations
was to expire. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and a second action was filed on Sept.
16, 1878. This action was dismissed on Sept. 20, 1878, and a third action was filed on Sept.
24, 1878. The defendant contended that this third action was barred by the statute of limita-
tions, but the court said that it was saved by the Ohio saving statute. If the second action was
brought before the statute of limitations expired, being filed on the last day, and dismissed after
the statute had run, then the case can only be cited as having allowed one action brought
within the "saving" year. Section 1.14 of the Ohio Revised Code would seem to authorize this
interpretation. The opinion of the court in Schock is unclear, but the court does state that the
third action was commenced after the statute of limitations had run and refers only to the second
action as having been filed on the day the statute expired.
The case, having been decided by the Hamilton County District Court, before both Siegfried
and Bush, is of dubious value as precedent to authorize successive suits to be filed within the
extension year allowed by the saving statute. The ambiguity of the holding was noted in
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 175 Okla. 475, 477, 53 P.2d 284, 287 (1935).
In Shircliff v. Elliott, 384 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1967), plaintiff was allowed to file two ac-
tions within Kentucky's ninety day extension period. The court noted that only one extension
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without either suggesting that this would change the Beckner holding-nor advo-
cating that it should-it seems proper to recognize that to have held as the Court
of Appeals did in Beckner would have allowed the plaintiff to refile the action
but once.
As a result of the relationship between sections 2323.05 and 2305.19 of the
Ohio Revised Code, as interpreted by Beckner, a trap awaits an unsuspecting attor-
ney. For, on the face of statutes, it would seem that a plaintiff who voluntarily
dismisses should be able to refile successfully under the saving statute. If the dis-
missal is granted "without prejudice," an attorney might well assume that the prior
dismissal will not affect recommencement of his suit. One might also interpret
"failure otherwise than upon the merits" as including a dismissal "without preju-
dice"2 6 which is, by definition, not on the merits. The holding of the court of
appeals in the principal case, by liberalizing the interpretation of the statutes, would
seemingly conform to the apparent meaning of the statutes by making a dismissal
without prejudice actually mean that the commencement of another action would
not be barred.
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice exists by statute, but of-
ten it may not exist in fact. In Beckner the cause came to trial almost two years and
six months after the petition was filed. This was more than one year after the stat-
ute of limitations had run. Therefore, long before the trial was commenced, the
plaintiff could not have dismissed without prejudice since the statute of limitations
had run and the saving statute was, as resulted, not applicable. The right to so dis-
miss was unexercisable for this plaintiff as it might be for many others. Suspend-
ing for a moment the question as to whether the right to dismiss voluntarily without
prejudice should exist, the fact that it is written in the code means, one would think,
that it should be capable of being exercised.
The major cause for the impossibility of exercising this right in Beckner v.
Stover and many other cases, especially personal injury suits which constitute many
of the cases presented in courts today, is the congestion in the court system. If the
object is to curb the right of voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff, which has been
criticized as being both inequitable to the defendant and antiquated,27 it is question-
able whether the proper way to suspend the right, because of the possibility of its
being abused, is by the unplanned and unwanted backlog in the courts.
Since Ohio is now in the process of revising its procedural rules, assessment of
the current rule in Ohio on voluntary dismissal as compared to Rule 41 (a) (1) of
the Federal Rules is pertinent. Rule 41 (a) (1) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily
dismiss an action at any time before service by the defendant of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. The dismissal is without prejudice to the com-
mencement of another action.2 The purpose of this rule, which limits the plaintiff's
right much more than Ohio's current rule, ". . .is to facilitate the voluntary dis-
missal of an action, but safeguard abuse of the right by limiting its application to an
period was allowed plaintiff. But to avoid a defeat on technicalities of venue to a plaintiff
acting in good faith and not harassing defendant, the court allowed plaintiff to refile a second
time within the extension period. The court cited the Schock case as authority for this principle
of successive actions in the extension period and, as noted above, that case seems to be a rather
questionable authority. However, the Court of Appeals stressed the good faith of the plaintiff
and the lack of harrassment to the defendant.
26 For cases that follow this reasoning see Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1961).
27 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE g 41.02 [1], at 1019 (2d ed. 1969); 7 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 357 (1966).
2 8 FE R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1).
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early stage of the proceedings."2-'  Any dismissal after this stage may be made only
by order of the court when such a course is deemed to be proper.
Any change in Ohio's rule should take into account the above purpose of the
Federal Rule as well as other factors referred to previously. The new Ohio rule on
dismissal of actions could simply not allow voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff. As
long as the plaintiff has freedom to amend his complaint the right to dismiss with-
out prejudice is unnecessary if the concern, in the first place, is to avoid the adjudi-
cation of one's rights on procedural technicalities rather than upon the merits. The
right has been criticized for several reasons, 3o and it has been suggested, for the
Federal Rules, to curb the right even further in order to lessen the waste of the
court's time.al
The tentative proposal for the new Ohio rule will permit the plaintiff to volun-
tarily dismiss without prejudice at any time before commencement of the trial.
This would be at the point where the judge asks the counsel if they are ready to
proceed. This rule would grant the plaintiff much more time to exercise his right
than exists under the current Federal Rule due to the generally long time lapse be-
tween the service of the answer and the commencement of the trial. The proposed
rule would also define as "failures other than on the merits" dismissals for improper
venue, for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, or of failure to
join a party under Rule 19 (persons needed for a just adjudication). Rulings such
as these would seemingly come within the Beckner definition of a "failure other-
wise than upon the merits" preventing a trial on the merits. If such a rule is
adopted, Beckner would then be applicable to the period between the filing of the
complaint and the commencement of the trial. After the latter point is reached
any dismissal would have to come by order of the court.
The right to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice under this proposal would
still be illusory in many cases. Due to the various factors causing the congestion in
the courts, the time lag between the commencement of an action and commencement
of trial is often great3 2 The statute of limitations might run as it did in Beckner,
long before the trial is commenced. After it runs the plaintiff will often not be
able to dismiss without prejudice due to Beckner. The right, in reality, will exist
only in the period between filing the complaint and before the statute of limitations
runs.
However, at present, the current case law, coupled with the backlog in the ad-
ministration of the courts, greatly curtails the right to voluntarily dismiss without
prejudice by restricting the use of the saving statute. The interpretation of the
statutes is narrow and effectively renders the phrase "without prejudice" meaning-
29 5 J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 41.02 [1], at 1019 (2d ed. 1968).
80 Authorities cited supra note 27; when plaintiff dismissed in the Beckner trial the trial
judge remarked: "The motion will be sustained. I want to make this one statement, and I want
to make it for the record. I think this is an abuse of the time of the court, the jury, the parties
and the counsel, but since the statute provides that the plaintiff has a right to do so, the Court
has no alternative .... It will be dismissed without prejudice .. " Additional Record at 7.
31 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 5 41.02 [3], at 1031 (2d ed. 1969).
32 A recent study of personal injury suits tried by jury reports that the average time between
the service of the answer and the time of trial in 101 jurisdictions across the country was 22.1
months. This was based on cases coming to trial in a one-year period ending April 30, 1969.
For the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County the average delay was 20.0 months in such
suits. In 1968 it was 18.5 months. Cuyahoga County reported an average delay of 35.4
months in 1968. For 1969 the figure dropped to 10.5 months (this was an estimate not based
on the formula recommended by the committee). Hamilton County failed to furnish data.
The Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study-1969, State Trial Courts of
General Jurisdiction-Personal Injury Cases, August 1, 1969.
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less. For clarification it would seem advantageous to enact the tentative proposal
as discussed above or the current Federal Rule thereby directly limiting the right
while providing the plaintiff greater liberty to amend and giving the court the power
to dismiss or not when just or equitable considerations so demand. The saving
statute would then exist to assist a plaintiff faced with procedural problems to gain
an extra year when he cannot, in the court's opinion, try his case on the merits.
Limiting the present and rather broad right to voluntarily dismiss without prej-
udice, which is often non-existent in fact, will more adequately protect the parties.
The statutes now purport to grant a right which practice denies. The complete cure
of this situation would be abolition of the right. Though neither the current Fed-
eral Rule nor the tentative Ohio rule go this far, the former is more satisfactory
than the latter since the restriction is greater. It should be noted again that the
congestion in the courts, apparently increasing rather than decreasing, does ad-
versely affect the exercise of rights. The right to voluntarily dismiss without prej-
udice, if it were capable of being exercised, would constitute one factor delaying
the adjudication of cases. However, it is not the only factor. A solution of this
problem is necessary in the interest of the efficient and equitable administration of
justice.
Thomas E. Roberts
UNFAIR TRADE-PERMISSIBLE USE OF ANOTHER'S TR.ADEmRK-Geisel v.
Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)-In 1932, Theodor
Seuss Geisel, plaintiff, under the pen name "Dr. Seuss," prepared a series of
twenty-three "cartoon essays" for Liberty Magazine. Each cartoon contained several
"animal creations." Geisel himself retained no copyrights on the cartoons, but
simply sold them, with all rights,' to Liberty Magazine. Liberty obtained a copy-
right, which embraced the entire issue, on each issue of the publication. Through
a series of assignments, the rights in the cartoons became, in 1964, the property of
the defendant Liberty Library Corporation, Liberty Magazine having ceased publi-
cation. In order to exploit these rights, Liberty Library Corporation granted to
the defendant Poynter Products, Inc., a license to manufacture dolls based on the
Dr. Seuss cartoons. Donald Poynter of Poynter Products designed and produced
the three-dimensional toy dolls, imitating as closely as possible the cartoon draw-
ings created by Dr. Seuss. On the bottoms of the dolls, on hang tags, on display
cartons, and on advertising handbills were the following expressions:
From Original Illustrations of Dr. Seuss
From the Wonderful World of Dr. Seuss
from Dr. Seuss' Merry Menagerie
The format of the name "Dr. Seuss" was copied exactly as the plaintiff used it in
all of his works. On February 16, 1968, the dolls were offered for sale.
On March 12, 1968, the plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary restraining
order which restrained the defendants from using the name "Dr. Seuss" in any way
connected with the dolls. The defendants ceased selling the dolls. On April 9,
3 This was a factual determination by the Court based upon extensive testimony as to the
transaction and as to trade customs of the 1930's. The magazine was held to have been granted
the common-law copyright and the right to secure a statutory copyright. Geisel v. Poyner
Productions, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 335-44. (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
[Vol. 31
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1968, the Court issued a temporary injunction2 pendente lite which restrained the
defendants from using the plaintiff's name in any misleading or deceiving way.3
After April 9, 1968, the defendants began to sell the dolls again, but changed
the printed advertisements and slogans to read as follows in an effort to comply
with the injunction:
Toys CREATED, DESIGNED & PRODUCED EXCLUSIVELY BY DON POYNTER
MERRY MENAGERIE BASED ON LIBERTY MAGAZINE ILLUSTRATIONS
BY DR. SEUSS
The names "Dr. Seuss" and "Don Poynter" were in the same size and style of
type.
In this litigation, the plaintiff sought to permanently enjoin the defendants
from using the name "Dr. Seuss" in any way without his consent. The plaintiff
also sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging 4 that the defendants had
violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act,5 which generally forbids
false designations of the origin of a product.
After determining that the plaintiff's sale of the cartoons to Liberty Magazine
in 1932 without reservation constituted a grant of all the rights in the cartoons, the
court held6 that the defendant Liberty Library, as owner of the copyright, had the
right to copy three-dimensional figures, or license others to do so, from the two-
dimensional cartoons created by Dr. Seuss. To arrive at this decision the Court
first noted it to be a settled rule that the owner of a copyright on work in one me-
2 The Court decided that there was "a reasonable probability of plaintiffs success" on the
trial of the Lanham Act (use of trade name) cause of action, 295 F. Supp. at 333.
3 The temporary injunction restrained defendants from:
A. Representing that defendants' doll, toy, or other similar product has been
created, designed, produced, approved, or authorized by plaintiff;
B. Describing defendants' doll, toy, or other similar product as having been
created, designed, produced, approved, or authorized by plaintiff; or
C. Representing, describing, or designating plaintiff as the originator, creator, de-
signer, or producer of defendants' doll, toy or other similar products, 295 F. Supp. at
334.
4 Plaintiff had four other claims which were rather quickly set aside by the Court and are
not important to this discussion:
a. Unfair competition under Section 368-d of the New York General Business
Law, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1968). This statute did not apply
because the contractual relation existed between parties, and because there was no show-
ing of a "liklihood of injury to business reputation," 295 F. Supp. at 355;
b. Violation of plaintiffs right of privacy under the New York Civil Rights
Law. Jaccard v. R. H. Macy & Co., 265 App. Div. 15, 37 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1942) held
that the Civil Rights Law does not protect an assumed or trade name such as "Dr.
Seuss," 295 F. Supp. at 356;
c. Defamation, and
d. Conspiracy to injure, which were little more than frivolous claims, 295 F. Supp.
at 357, 358.
5 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964) provides:
§1125 False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols
tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or ser-
vices to enter into commerce .... shall be liable to a civil action ... by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false descrip-
tion or representation.
0 Ths reaffirmed the temporary injunction decision.
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dium is protected against infringement of that copyright in a different medium.7
This rule was established by King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer,8 in which the
plaintiff held a copyright on a book of cartoons which pictured "Barney Google and
Spark Plug" (a horse). The defendant manufactured a toy horse named "Sparky,"
in exact imitation of the cartoon picture of "Spark Plug." This was held to infringe
the plaintiff's copyright, since a three-dimensional toy figure can be a copy of a
two-dimensional cartoon. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.9 re-
affirmed the holding of King Features, and added that the three-dimensional copy
need not be an exact copy of the two-dimensional to constitute an infringement.
In Fleischer the defendant had produced a doll extremely similar to the plaintiff's
"Betty Boop" cartoon drawings, except for the way in which the doll's hair was ar-
ranged.
Taking this well-established rule, the Geisel court reasoned that since the owner
of a copyright may protect his property from infringement in other media, it fol-
lows that the owner himself may, as part of his right under the copyright, copy or
transform the work into a different medium. Thus, the owner of copyrighted two-
dimensional cartoons has the right to produce three-dimensional figures from those
cartoons.' 0
The plaintiff's primary contention was that the defendants' use of the trade
name "Dr. Seuss," both before and after the temporary injunction and revision of
the labels, was wrongful. The Court agreed that before March 12, 1968, the de-
fendants had violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by their use of the name
"Dr. Seuss," since the manner of use'1 created the false impression that the dolls
were authorized by the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff made no showing of mea-
surable damages for this period, and therefore was entitled to no recovery. The
Court went on to hold that the defendants' use of the plaintiff's trade name after
April 9, 1968, was a permissible use and did not violate Section 43(a)12 of the
Lanham Act.
A trade name' 3 such as "Dr. Seuss" may be established by adoption and use 14
7 Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. at 350.
8299 F. 533 ( 2d Cir. 1924).
9 5 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
10 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) seems to support this result, by giving the owner of a copyright
the exclusive right to "copy" the copyrighted work. It would seem that production of three-
dimensional figures based on two-dimensional cartoons should be considered "copying" such
cartoons, so 17 U.S.C. § 1 should apply here.
11 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
12 See note 5 supra.
Is "Dr. Seuss" is an assumed name taken from plaintiff's name, Theodor Seuss Geisel.
The Geisel Court designated "Dr. Seuss" a trade name, 295 F. Supp. at 352, but it cited as pre-
cedent cases dealing with both trade name and trademark. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
715, 716 (1938), gives very similar but different definitions to "trademark" and "trade name,"
but "trademark" is defined to exclude personal names. "Dr. Seuss" is a personal name, even
though it is a pseudonym. Section 716 of the Restatement defines "trade name":
A trade name is any designation which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he markets or
services which he renders or a business which he conducts, or has come to be so used
by others, and
(b) through its association with such goods, services or business, has acquired a
special significance as the name thereof, and
(c) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohibited neither by
a legislative enactment nor by an otherwise defined public policy.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, §§ 715, 716 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) would somewhat
alter the above definition.
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but it must acquire a "secondary meaning" as identifying particular goods or serv-
ices before it is entitled to full protection. It belongs to the person who first uses
it and gives it value in a particular field. 15 An exclusive, firmly established trade
name such as "Dr. Seuss" which has acquired a secondary meaning is protected
very much on the same principles and scope as are trademarks, under both the Lan-
ham Act and the common law.16
Even though a person has a valid trademark or trade name, it does not follow
that all other persons are prohibited from making any uses of that mark or name.
The controlling rule on the permissible use of another's mark was first expounded
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty.17 In Coty, the owner of a
trademark was not permitted to enjoin another from rebottling and selling Coty's
products with labels that truthfully disclosed that Coty was the source of the prod-
uct. Justice Holmes explained,
fwjhen the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see
no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.' 8
In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,'9 the defendant was reconditioning
and reselling used Champion Spark Plugs, using the name "Champion" on the
plugs and boxes for resale. The Court, citing Prestonettes with approval, held that
the defendant had the right to use Champion's name, because a trademark may al-
ways be used by another, provided there is full and "meticulously truthful" dis-
closure of the origin and nature of the product. Justice Douglas stated that the
second-hand dealer under this rule obviously gets some advantage from use of the
trademark,
[blut under the rule of Prestonettes ... that is wholly permissible so long
as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualitiies of the
product.... 20
Thus, under the common law rule, the owner of a trademark or trade name may
only prohibit the use of the mark so far as is necessary to protect the owner's good
will.2 1 A manufacturer or owner is entitled to full disclosure by one using his
trade name, but no more.
14 RESTATEBM,1ENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938); S. C. OPPENNEm, UNFAR TRADE PRACrICES
43, 44 (2d ed. 1965).
15Western Auto Supply Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 13 F. Supp. 525 (D.C.N.H.
1936).
16 OPPENHEM, supra note 14, at 44, 45; Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. Waldman, 30 Cal. 2d
268, 181 P.2d 865 (1947); Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
17264 U.S. 359 (1924).
Is Id. at 368.
10 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
20Id. at 130.
2 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717 (1938) provides:
(1) One infringes another's trade name, if
(a) without a privilege to do so, he uses in his business, in the manner of a trade-
mark or trade name, a designation which is identical with or confusingly similar to
the other's trade name, though he does not use the designation for the purpose of
deception, and
(b) the other's interest in his trade name is protected with reference to
(i) the goods, services or business in connection with which the actor
uses his designation, and
(ii) the markets in which the actor uses his designation.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, § 717 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) would make minor
alterations to the above definition.
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A recent case interpreted Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to give a trade
name or trademark owner the same rights he had under the common law rule. In
Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Establissements Boussac v. Alexander's
Department Stores, Inc.22 a fashion designer sued a department store for supposedly
wrongful use of the designer's trademark in defendant's sales of copies of the de-
signer's dresses. The Court, citing Justice Holmes in Prestonettes, held that the
Lanham Act created no enforceable claim in favor of a trademark owner in the ab-
sence of deception of the public as to the origin of the product identified by the
mark.
In the Geisel case, the defendants stood in at least as good a position as the de-
fendants in the above cases. In Geisel, there was the additional factor of a con-
tractual relation between the parties through which the defendants owned all rights
in the Dr. Seuss cartoons. That ownership, reasoned the Geisel Court, "must in-
dude some right to use the name 'Dr. Seuss' because that name appeared on each
of the pages of cartoons in Liberty Magazine." 23 The defendants' explanations on
the dolls that they were "based on" original drawings by Dr. Seuss satisfied the
requirement of full disclosure and certainly had no tendency to deceive the public.
Moreover, even without the contractual relation, the defendants would appear to
have been properly using the plaintiff's name, under the guidelines established by
the previous cases and under the Lanham Act.
Geisel extends the rule of Prestonettes and Champion to artistic creations.
Geisel allows a defendant to exploit to a limited extent the goodwill of a plaintiff's
mark. But this is not a necessarily undersirable result; it does not undermine the
policy behind trademark protection. Various arguments are often asserted to justify
the protection of trademarks and trade names. One such argument is that consumers
rely upon a "brand-name" as an indication of quality. Many writers urge that
trademark protection encourages freely competitive economic development. His-
torically, courts have emphasized that a trademark is a type of property entitled to
protection, against three impositions: diversion of sales; discrediting of a mark by
association with inferior products; and dilution of the significance of a mark as to a
particular origin. Another argument for protection is that fair-dealing marketing
policy disallows one to get a "free ride on the coat tails" of another's good will.24
But the Geisel Court applied the Prestonettes doctrine properly in this case.
None of the arguments justifying protection of trademarks indicates that an owner
need be protected against the Geisel type of use. Moreover, it may be economically
undesirable to prohibit such a use. As Justice Douglas noted in Champion,25 it
would be absurd to require a reconditioner of used cars to remove the name "Ford"
or "Chevrolet" from the cars for resale. To require the defendants in Geisel to ab-
stain from any mention of the plaintiff's name would suggest the same type over-
protectiveness.
Thomas Freiburger
22 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 5 Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24 OPPENHEIM, supra note 14, at 38, 39.
25 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947).
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